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Abstract: This paper is concerned with the business cycle dynamics in search-and-matching models of the 
labor market when agents are ex post heterogeneous. We focus on wealth heterogeneity that comes as a 
result of imperfect opportunities to insure against idiosyncratic risk. We show that this heterogeneity 
implies wage rigidity relative to a complete insurance economy. The fraction of wealth-poor agents 
prevents real wages from falling too much in recessions since small decreases in income imply large losses 
in utility. Analogously, wages rise less in expansions compared with the standard model because small 
increases are enough for poor workers to accept job offers. This mechanism reduces the volatility of wages 
and increases the volatility of vacancies and unemployment. This channel can be relevant if the lack of 
insurance is large enough so that the fraction of agents close to the borrowing constraint is significant. 
However, discipline in the parameterization implies an earnings variance and persistence in the 
unemployment state that result in a large degree of self-insurance. 
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Shimer (2005) showed that a standard Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model
augmented with aggregate shocks generated a much lower volatility in the vacancies-
to-unemployment (V − U) ratio than that observed in the data. The empirical value
is about 20 times as large as the value generated by the model. Search and matching
models generate a non-trivial idiosyncratic employment risk, and as a result, potentially
a large dispersion in asset holdings. Here we show that this heterogeneity in asset holdings
acts as a device that smooths wage ﬂuctuations. As it will become clearer below, when
the negotiation of wages takes place, the fraction of agents close to or at the borrowing
constraint prevents wages from falling too much during a recession: small decreases in
the real wage imply large losses in utility. Analogously, during an expansion a mild
increase in wages is enough for very poor agents to accept a job oﬀer, as their utility
increases substantially. Firms react by posting more vacancies during booms and fewer
during expansions than they would otherwise. This mechanism is capable of increasing
substantially the volatility of the V − U ratio, and in fact, a model where agents are
heterogeneous in their degree of patience can multiply the volatility of the V −U ratio by
a factor of four. However, too large a fraction of agents need to be borrowing constrained.
We explore other features that prevent agents from smoothing out shocks eﬀectively and
show that in most reasonable parameterizations the introduction of uninsurable risk has a
small quantitative eﬀect, although the volatilities of the V −U ratio and wages are closer
to their empirical values relative to a full insurance economy.
The model economy we present is a version of the stochastic growth model with labor
search and matching frictions. There is a representative ﬁrm that posts job vacancies, and
workers search when they are unemployed, hoping to get matched to a job oﬀer. Employed
workers are at risk of losing their job and becoming unemployed. However, we assume
that there is no insurance mechanism that can perfectly eliminate the employment risk:
agents have to self insure using their holdings of physical capital only. Our results show
that, quantitatively, the ability of agents to smooth consumption eﬀectively is responsible
for the similarity between the full insurance economy and the economies with idiosyncratic
1risk. Uninsurable risk helps, but it is not enough to bring the volatility of the V −U ratio
anywhere close to the data.
The reason for the negligible impact of introducing idiosyncratic risk is that, given the
magnitude of shocks, the degree of self-insurance is remarkably good. This results in a
very small fraction of agents close or at the borrowing constraint. This is consistent with
Krusell and Smith’s (1998) result, where the lack of perfect insurance in a version of the
stochastic growth model generates too few poor agents and many rich individuals. The
degree of persistence and variance in the employment-unemployment transitions is not
enough to prevent people from smoothing out shocks eﬀectively. Besides heterogeneity
in the discount factors, we evaluate the eﬀects of introducing (separately) the following
features in the model: an irreversibility constraint on investment, a minimum consumption
requirement, and diﬀerent productivity levels across workers. All these versions improve
relative to the full insurance economy. In some cases, the improvement is quite signiﬁcant.
For instance, assuming productivity shocks that aﬀect workers can double the volatility
of the V − U ratio in comparison to the full insurance model.
There is by now a large literature on search and matching in the labor markets.
Nevertheless, research that focuses on business cycles has not widely accepted the search
model as the standard way of thinking about labor markets. There are exceptions such as
Andolfatto (1993) and Merz (1995). These two examples assume that all workers belong
to a household. In this household, some agents work and others search, but they all
insure each other against being ﬁred or not ﬁnding a job. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)
focus on the optimal unemployment insurance contract in a search environment with
capital accumulation and where agents are risk averse. However, they do not introduce
aggregate shocks. In a line of research more related to our paper, Rudanko (2006) builds
an economy in which agents face idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. She introduces search
and matching frictions in the labor market, and long term contracts in wages where the
ﬁrm provides insurance to the worker against drops in productivity. A key diﬀerence
between hers and our paper is that there is no capital accumulation (or any form of
savings) in her model. The worker consumes the wage and the unemployed consumes the
2unemployment beneﬁt. As we show here, savings are key at explaining the inability of
the presence of uninsurable risk to amplify aggregate ﬂuctuations relative to the perfect
insurance economy.
2 The Model
The model is a version of the one-sector stochastic growth model with labor market search
frictions and where opportunities for perfect insurance are absent. There is a continuum
of agents distributed uniformly on the unit interval. They are all endowed with one unit
of time and maximize expected lifetime utility of consumption E0
P∞
t=0 βtu(ct), where u
satisﬁes the usual conditions and β is a factor of time preference. Each agent faces diﬀerent
opportunities for exchanging labor services. In particular, individuals either have a job
opportunity or not, and job opportunities arrive at random as is typical in the standard
labor market search model. The absence of a full set of contingent claims implies that an
agent’s employment status determines his income. To smooth consumption across states
and time, agents can only use physical capital and they are all endowed with k0 of it to
start with. The initial employment status is also given.
There is a continuum of risk neutral entrepreneurs who maximize E0
P∞
t=0 βtφt, where
φ is the sum of current period cash ﬂows from ﬁrms that they own 1. Firms use capital
K and labor N to produce output Y subject to a constant returns-to-scale production
technology Y = zF(K,N). The aggregate productivity z of ﬁrms evolves according to a
stochastic process known by agents.
In order to produce output, each job requires a worker. Let Nt denote the number
of jobs that are matched with a worker at the beginning of period t; hence, Nt is the
measure of current period employed workers and 1 − Nt is the measure of unemployed
workers currently available for work. Let Vt denote the total number of new jobs made
available by ﬁrms during period t. Following Pissarides (2001), the rate at which new
job matches is governed by an aggregate matching technology, M(Vt,1−Nt), so that the
1In principle, φt could be negative. However, this was not the case in any of our simulations.
3employment evolves according to:
Nt+1 = (1 − st)Nt + Mt,
where st ∈ (0,1) is the exogenous separation rate of job-worker pairs at time t. The
probability for a worker to ﬁnd a job oﬀer is πt = M (Vt,1 − Nt)/(1 − Nt) and the
probability for a ﬁrm to match a worker with a vacancy is pt = M (Vt,1 − Nt)/Vt.
2.1 Optimization
The agents’ employment status is determined by whether they successfully matched with
a ﬁrm the previous period (in case they were unemployed) and whether they were exoge-
nously separated (in case they were employed). This random matching and separation
process induces diﬀerent employment histories among agents and consequently leads to
heterogeneous asset holdings. Let Qt (k,i) denote the joint distribution of individual cap-
ital holdings and employment status at period t. This cross-sectional distribution evolves
according to the law of motion
Qt+1 = H (Qt,zt).
Let χt ≡ (zt,Qt) and kt be the set of state variables in the agents’ problem, which involves
choosing a level of consumption ci, and saving ki contingent upon the agent’s employment
status i. The employment status can be i = e, which denotes working, or i = u, which
denotes searching (or being unemployed). The measure of unemployed and employed









We now switch notation slightly and we will denote variables with no subscript to be
current period variables and variables with a prime to be next period’s variables. De-
noting by Je the value function for an employed worker and Ju the value function for
an unemployed worker, the Bellman equation for an agent who works during the current
4period is:
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′ = H (χ). (3)
The value function of the worker is determined by the wage she obtains the current period
plus the capital income obtained by renting capital. The worker takes into account she
might be unemployed tomorrow with probability s and remain employed with probability
1 − s. The constraints in this optimization problem are the budget constraint for the
employed worker, a non-negativity constraint for capital holdings, and a law of motion
for the aggregate distribution of asset holdings. The wage rate w is determined by a
bargaining rule to be discussed later and the interest rate R is determined in a competitive
ﬁnancial market.
Analogously the Bellman equation for an agent who searches the current period is:
J




























′ = H (χ). (6)
An unemployed agent receives no beneﬁts or any other sources of income besides capital
income from her asset holdings. In her optimization problem, she conditions on the
probability π of being matched with a ﬁrm this period and working the following period
and the probability of remaining unemployed (1 − π).
The ownership structure of ﬁrms and the constant returns-to-scale production technol-
ogy allow us to only consider a representative ﬁrm which maximizes the present discounted
value of the stream of future proﬁts. A ﬁrm interested in ﬁlling an available job must
undertake recruiting and screening activities, which are necessary for ﬁnding a suitable
employee. Let ω denote the unitary cost of recruiting, the representative ﬁrm chooses a
contingency plan {Vt,Kt}
∞
t=0 that maximizes the expected discounted sum of cash ﬂows.
5The Bellman equation for this maximization problem is:











′ = (1 − s)N + pV, (8)
Q
′ = H (χ). (9)
In the ﬁrm’s Bellman equation we explicitly diﬀerentiate between the capital demanded
by the ﬁrm, Kd, and the capital supplied by the individuals, implicit in the state vector
χ. After equating these two in equalibrium, the optimal choices for the ﬁrm are given by

















2.2 Timing of Events
1. At the beginning of period t, the aggregate productivity shock zt is revealed and
publicly observed.
2. Goods and capital markets open.
(a) A representative ﬁrm rents capital from both types of agents (workers and
searchers), uses Nt units of labor to produce output, and posts new job vacan-
cies Vt.
(b) The worker provides inelastic labor service to the ﬁrm and, in return, receives
wage payments from the ﬁrm, which are determined by a bargaining rule.
Besides labor income, the worker also receives interest payments on capital
and makes consumption and investment decisions.
(c) The searcher receives no wage income and ﬁnances consumption and investment
decisions with capital interest payments.
3. Goods and capital markets close and the labor market opens:
6(a) The unemployed individuals and the ﬁrm search in the labor market. If they
are successfully matched a new job is created which will be ﬁlled the following
period. The matching rate πt is i.i.d across all unemployed individuals.
(b) The employed agents might be separated from their current match with prob-
ability s. They must wait until the following period to search for work.
(c) The workers who remain employed and those who are successfully matched
with the ﬁrm constitute a class of employed workers the following period.
4. The labor market closes.
2.3 Wage Bargaining
If bargaining occurs between the ﬁrm and each worker, the outcome will be an entire
distribution of individual-speciﬁc wages. The purpose of this paper is not to understand
wage dispersion or the dynamics of the income distribution, and therefore we assume that
workers can form a labor union. The ﬁrm negotiates with the union rather than with
individuals. The objective of the labor union is to maximize the aggregate surplus of all
workers, which is given by,
Z
[J




e [Je (k,χ) − Ju (k,χ)]dQ + (1 − N)
R
u [Je (k,χ) − Ju (k,χ)]dQ .
In the previous expression the symbol
R
i,i ∈ {e,u} means integrating over assets held
only by either employed or unemployed agents. The marginal value of a match for the
















[Je (k,χ) − Ju (k,χ)]dQ
￿




where ˜ Λ = N
R
e u′ (ce (k,χ))dQ + (1 − Nt)
R
u u′ (cu (k,χ))dQ is the marginal payoﬀ of
being employed.
7The marginal value of employment for the ﬁrm can be obtained from (7) and (8),
∂W (χ)
∂N
= (1 − α)zK
αN




Substituting (13) into (12), we have the wage equation
w = (1 − α)zK
αN
−α +








[Je (k,χ) − Ju (k,χ)]dQ
￿
(14)














A recursive competitive equilibrium is a pair of price functions R and w, the individu-
als’s value functions Ju (k,χ) and Je (k,χ), decision rules k′ (k,χ), c(k,χ) and vacancies
posted V , and a law of motion H for Q such that
1. Given prices, the number of job vacancies V which determines the matching prob-
ability, and H, the value function solves the agents’ optimization problem and the
optimal decision rules are k′ (k,χ), c(k,χ).
2. Given the decision rule f, the optimal job posting rule V is determined by maximiz-
ing the ﬁrm’s discounted present value of proﬁts, i.e. V satisﬁes (15);
3. The interest rate R satisﬁes (10) and the wage rate is a solution of Nash bargaining
(14);
4. The decision rule f and the Markov processes for z and s imply that today’s distri-
bution Q is mapped into tomorrow’s Q′ by H;
5. Goods market must clear:
Z
cdQ + K
′ − (1 − δ)K + ωV = zK
αN
1−α. (16)
8As is typical in models with idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, one needs to avoid having
the entire distribution Q as a state variable in order to obtain quantitative results. As
other examples in the literature, we followed Krusell and Smith (1998) and others in
summarizing the distribution Q by a vector of its moments m and replacing H by some
polynomial that determines m′ as a function of m. It turned out that, as in Krusell and
Smith’s case, the aggregate capital stock suﬃced to summarize the entire distribution
of capital holdings. For the interested reader, we provide a detailed description of our
solution method and some computational subtleties in an Appendix.
2.5 Full Insurance
Suppose that workers live together in a very large extended family, called a household.
There are a continuum of identical households in the economy, and their mass is normal-
ized to 1. Each household member is perfectly insured by the other household members
against variations in labor income due to employment status. The structure of goods and
factors markets is identical to the idiosyncratic risk case. The household’s problem can
then be written as the following dynamic programming problem:
J (z,K,N) = max




s.t. C + K
′ = wN + (R + 1 − δ)K,
N
′ = N (1 − s) + (1 − N)π.
The ﬁrm’s problem remains the same as before. The wages are determined by the
Nash bargaining. Hence the wage equation and the optimal job posting are given by:
wt = (1 − α)zK
αN
−α +




































In choosing functional forms and parameter values we have either followed previous re-
search or set parameters to match a few steady state moments.
Regarding preferences we chose the constant relative risk aversion as our per period
utility function. This functional form is widely popular in the macroeconomics literature




The value for σ that macroeconomists generally use, ranges from 1 to 4. We have
chosen 1.5 as the benchmark but provide some sensitivity analysis for changing that
value. The agents’ discount factor β was set at 0.99. This is the usual choice in inﬁnite
horizon economies modeled at the quarterly frequency. In a complete markets framework
it implies an annual interest rate of approximately 4.2 percent.




Capital’s share in national income has averaged about 36% for the US in the post-
war period. As a result we set α to 0.36. The autocorrelation and the variance of the
total factor productivity shock zt are set to roughly match the observed persistence and
variability of deviations from trend in the Solow residual. For simplicity we restrict zt to








We chose a Cobb-Douglas as the functional form for the matching technology. This is
the most common choice in models of search and matching in labor markets.
M(V,1 − N) =  V
γ(1 − N)
1−γ
The parameter γ was set equal to ξ, the parameter driving the ﬁrm’s bargaining power,
which in complete markets models ensures that the allocation in the decentralized economy
10Table 1: Summary of Parameterization
Parameter Value Target/Source
α 0.36 NIPA
β 0.99 r ≃ 4.2%
s 0.1 Andolfatto (1993)
σ 1.5 –
ξ – C/Y = 0.75
  – wV/Y = 0.03
δ – V/U = 12.1
ω – π = 0.62
is the same is in the social optimum. The parameters ξ,  , δ and ω were set so that they
match four moments: a consumption-to-output ratio of 0.75, a vacancy-cost-to-output
ratio of about 0.03, an average vacancy-unemployment ratio of 12.1 and a matching
probability of approximately 0.62.
Finally, the separation rate s was set at 0.1 consistent with previous studies of labor
search and business cycles. The following table summarizes the parameterization:
4 Results
Tables 2 - 3 show some business cycle statistics for the US economy over the period
1951:1-2004:4. The variables we have focused on are output, consumption, employment,
the job ﬁnding probability, the V U ratio, corporate proﬁts and wages. All variables
(except the employment rate and the V U ratio) are in per capita real terms. Data on the
job ﬁnding rate and vacancies come from Robert Shimer’s website. Data on consumption,
output, corporate proﬁts and wages are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (National
Accounts). The employment rate is deﬁned as 1 minus the unemployment rate as reported
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. All variables were logged and HP-ﬁltered with a
smoothing parameter of 1600.
In terms of the volatilities, aside from the standard smaller volatilities of consumption
and labor relative to output, the most noticeable feature is the high volatility of the V U
11ratio with respect to GDP: it is larger by a factor of 17. Wages are also more volatile than
output but the magnitude is much smaller (a factor of 1.35). Consumption, employment,
the V − U ratio and wages are all quite procyclical, and employment also lags output
slightly.
Tables 4-8 display the business cycle statistics for both the full insurance and the
uninsurable risk economies, parameterized as described above. As is clear from Table 4,
in terms of volatilities both economies are virtually indistinguishable. The volatilities of
employment and consumption are almost exactly the same. There is a slight diﬀerence
in the volatility of the V − U ratio that increases from 86% of that of GDP in the full
insurance case to 93% in the uninsurable risk economy. This is a 7% increase, negligible
in light of the empirical magnitude. The volatility of real wages (last line in Table 4)
is quite similar, with somewhat smoother wages in the uninsurable risk economy. The
reason for this lower volatility is the one outlined before. The presence of very poor agents
helps to avoid a large decrease in wages during a recession. A small drop in consumption
implies a large drop in utility. This same mechanism increases wages during expansions
at a smaller rate compared to the standard model. Poor individuals are satisﬁed with a
smaller wage increase, as it raises substantially their utility level. However, as is clear
from the tables in the baseline model this eﬀect is quantitatively small. Tables 5-8 show
also very small diﬀerences in the cross correlations with GDP and the persistence of
macroeconomic aggregates across the two economies. The reason for the small diﬀerence
is that, as it has been shown in other contexts, agents overcome quite easily the lack
of perfect insurance. Although they only have one asset, physical capital, to smooth
out adverse shocks, the degree of persistence of the unemployment state is not too large
and agents can smooth consumption quite easily, making the two economies similar in
behavior. More evidence can be obtained by looking at the wealth distribution that results
from the baseline uninsurable risk economy. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution
of capital holdings for the baseline uninsurable risk economy: the fraction of agents close
to the borrowing constraint is practically zero.
In an attempt to evaluate how far the mechanism outlined in this paper can take us in
12magnifying the volatility of unemployment and vacancies we allow the discount factor to
change stochastically. Instead of ﬁxing β at 0.99, agents can transit across two degrees of
patience: βL = 0.1 and βH=0.999. The transition matrix that determines the conditional







In the matrix Πβ the ﬁrst line shows the conditional probabilities of moving from a
low patience state to a low patience and a high patience state respectively. Analogously,
the second row displays the conditional probabilities of staying and moving from a high
patience state. The wealth distribution for this economy is shown in Figure 2. There is a
point mass of agents at the constraint, and the fraction of agents close to it is very high.
The business cycle statistics for this parameterization are shown in Tables 9-11. The
volatilities of the four macroeconomic aggregates that we focus on vary substantially and
all the volatilities are higher than in the baseline model. For instance, employment and
consumption have their standard deviations with respect to output increased by a factor
of 8 and 2 respectively. The real wage is considerably smoother. The drop in its volatility
represents a 19% of the volatility of the model with perfect insurance. As expected, the
volatility of the V − U ratio rises signiﬁcantly. Its volatility relative to output is now
almost 4 (3.72), which is more than four times larger than the volatility attained with the
full insurance economy.
Clearly, this example is rather extreme, the fraction of agents at the borrowing con-
straint (66%) is very large, the average discount factor is too low and interest rates are
too high. However, quantitatively, the previous example shows that the mechanism which
is the focus of this paper can have a large impact on the volatility of the V − U ratio.
In the remainder of this section we will explore the implications of introducing additional
elements (returning to the case of a ﬁxed discount factor) with the purpose of analyzing
whether more reasonable parameterizations can be quantitatively relevant. We will focus
on three features: an irreversibility constraint in investment, a minimum consumption
requirement, and idiosyncratic productivity of working agents.
13The irreversibility constraint in investment hampers the ability of agents to smooth
consumption by limiting the amount of capital selling an individual can undertake in the
face of an adverse employment shock. Formally the constraint is written as:
k
′ ≥ 0.99k(1 − δ) (21)
Results for this case are displayed on Tables 12-14. The quantitative impact of the
irreversibility constraint is small. The only statistic that changes somewhat is the vari-
ability of the V −U ratio, which increases to a value of 1.05 (relative to output). The cross
correlations with output and the persistence of the macroeconomic series is quantitatively
very similar to the baseline idiosyncratic risk economy. The only minor diﬀerence is that
consumption is somewhat more persistent and a bit more procyclical. The second fea-
ture we introduced was a minimum consumption requirement so that now the per-period
utility function becomes u(c−c). For this experiment we removed the irreversibility con-
straint on investment. We experimented with three diﬀerent values for c: 0.01, 0.1 and
0.2. Tables 15-17 display results for c = 0.1 2. This new parameterization adds quanti-
tatively very little when compared with the baseline uninsured individual risk. The two
economies are virtually indistinguishable. Finally, we increased the volatility of earnings
by adding uncertain productivity levels for agents working. We denote this productivity




= wǫ + Rk + (1 − δ)k (22)
The shock can take on two values: ǫL = 0.1 and ǫH = 9.1. The transition matrix








We show in Tables 18-20 the business cycle statistics for this economy. There is
improvement with respect to the previous two modiﬁcations, but the standard deviation
2Results with c equal to 0.01 and 0.2 were very similar.
14of the V −U ratio is still far from its empirical value. Its volatility with respect to output
is now 2, which is a bit more than twice that of the full insurance case. The real wage is
somewhat smoother, 0.82 relative to output, while in the full insurance and the baseline
uninsured risk economies, the volatility of real wages was well above 0.90. The asset
CDFs for this and the baseline uninsurable risk economies are shown in Figure 3. In the
idiosyncratic productivity economy the wealth inequality is signiﬁcantly larger, with a
smaller fraction of agents holding “average levels of capital”. In addition, the fraction of
agents closer to the borrowing constraint is also larger, contributing to the doubling of
the volatility of the V − U ratio in comparison to the baseline economy.
5 Conclusion
The attitude towards risk and the absence of perfect insurance is an assumption that is
missing from many studies of economic ﬂuctuations with search in the labor markets. Our
research shows that the heterogeneity in asset holdings that results from assuming that
agents cannot insure perfectly the idiosyncratic risk acts as a mechanism that decreases the
volatility of wages and increases the volatility of the V −U ratio. The reason is that when
negotiating wages, the fraction of poor workers accept lower wages than they otherwise
would. Our starting point has been the Mortensen-Pissarides economy, to which we have
added idiosyncratic risk and limited the ability of agents to insure against that risk. We
show how heterogeneity in asset holdings helps when bringing the model’s implication
closer to the data. However, for this channel to have a large quantitative eﬀect a large
fraction of agents needs to be close to or at the borrowing constraint.
In most parameterizations, although agents only have access to one asset to smooth
consumption, the degree of self insurance is remarkably good. The Mortensen-Pissarides
economy where agents are unable to perfectly insure against the risk of being separated
from their current job or not being matched with a ﬁrm, is virtually indistinguishable
from the complete markets economy. To obtain sizable diﬀerences in the volatility of
the V − U ratio one needs to obtain high wealth inequality. Two features that we have
explored here are, ﬁrst, to assume that agents have varying degrees of patience, which
15aﬀect the preferred rate of asset accumulation; and second, to assume a large dispersion
in productivity within working agents. Each of these two features increases substantially
the standard deviation of the V − U ratio relative to output. However, only in the
heterogeneous patience case is the change large enough to have a considerable impact on
the volatility as compared to its empirical value. We conclude that other omissions from
the model must be chieﬂy responsible of the low volatility of the V − U ratio.
16A Solution Algorithm
The relevant aggregate state variables in the individual’s problem is ˜ χ = (z,N,K). Notice
that we have already replaced the distribution Q by its ﬁrst moment K. As we show below,
the accuracy of projecting K′, w and π on just K and N is extremely good. The solution
of the model entails computing the following objects.
1. Optimal decision rules for consumption ce (k; ˜ χ) and cu (k; ˜ χ), the value function
J (k; ˜ χ) and the marginal value of employment (∂J/∂N)(k; ˜ χ),
2. a matching probability function π(˜ χ),
3. a wage function w(˜ χ)
4. the law of motion for aggregate capital K′ (˜ χ).
A.1 Overview of the Algorithm
The solution algorithm is made up of the following steps (we will ﬁll in the details in later
subsection):
1. Choose aggregate grid points for N and K and the individual asset grid k.
2. Choose the class of polynomials to approximate the aggregate law of motion K′ (˜ χ),
the job ﬁnding rate π(˜ χ) and the wage function w(˜ χ). Make an initial guess on the
coeﬃcients of above functions. Choose suitable interpolation schemes to approxi-
mate the consumption functions ce (k;χ) and cu (k; ˜ χ), the decision rules k′
e (k; ˜ χ)
and k′
u (k; ˜ χ), and the value functions J (k; ˜ χ) and (∂J/∂N)(k; ˜ χ).
3. For a given aggregate law of motion, job ﬁnding probability and wage rate, solve
for the workers problem. This step involves solving for ce, cu, k′
e, k′
u, J and ∂J/∂N
at each grid point.
4. Given an initial guess on the wealth distribution, simulate the economy for a long
time series and use the policy rules obtained in (3) to calculate the wealth distri-
17bution Q, the matching probability π and the wage rate for each period. This step
involves iteratively solving for the optimal job posting equation (15).
5. Use the stationary region of the simulated data to estimate the new coeﬃcients in
K′ (˜ χ), π (˜ χ), and w(˜ χ).
6. Repeat steps 3-5 until convergence of the relevant functions is achieved.
7. Check whether the goodness of ﬁt is satisfactory. It it is not, then increase the
moments used to approximate the wealth distribution or try a diﬀerent functional
forms for K′, π and w.
A.2 Detail Description of the Algorithm
A.2.1 Solving the worker’s optimization problem
1. Setup the grid on k′, the end of period capital holdings (or next period capital
holdings). The grid of points is {k′
1,...,k′
n} with k′
1 = k the borrowing limit. Usually
this grid is ﬁner than the asset grid k.
2. Initially assume that workers do not save for tomorrow, which means they will
consume all the income:
c
e
0 = (R(˜ χ) + 1 − δ)k + w(˜ χ),
c
u
0 = (R(˜ χ) + 1 − δ)k.
Then calculate the value functions
J0 = Nu(c
e













3. At iteration step t ≥ 1, given any approximation of policy functions ce
t−1 and cu
t−1,
18calculate next period marginal utilities of consumption at each grid point (k′









































where N′ (˜ χ) = (1 − s)N + π(˜ χ)N.








i, ˜ χ) + MU
u (k
′
i, ˜ χ)), (24)
we can calculate the current consumption (e ce
i,e cu
i ) for each grid points k′
i, i = 1,...,n.
Since equation (??) is the same for employed or unemployed, we can suppress the
superscript on e c.
5. Use the budget constraints to recover the market resources (or income) at the be-
ginning of current period
e yi = e ci + k
′
i
6. Then {e yi}
n





e = (R(˜ χ) + 1 − δ)k + w(˜ χ),
y
u = (R(˜ χ) + 1 − δ)k,
we can simply use linear interpolation or other shape preserving schemes to obtain
the policy functions ˆ cj (yj, ˜ χ) for given values of aggregate states (˜ χ). We can update
the optimal consumption c
j
t (k, ˜ χ) from ˆ cj (yj, ˜ χ).3
3To handle the borrowing constraints k
′
j ≥ k, j = e,u, we need to do the following. If for any given
values of (k, ˜ χ), yj ≤ e y1, it implies that the borrowing constraint binds, we set c
j
t (k, ˜ χ) = yj − k and
k′
j (k, ˜ χ) = k.




8. Once we have the optimal comsumptions (ce
t,cu
t) and the value function Jt−1, we
compute the new value function
Jt (k,z,N,m) = N
￿
u(ce

















j can be calculated from
k
′
e (k, ˜ χ) = (R(˜ χ) + 1 − δ)k + w(˜ χ) − c
e
t (k, ˜ χ),
k
′
u (k, ˜ χ) = (R(˜ χ) + 1 − δ)k − c
u
t (k, ˜ χ).
9. Use (ce
t,cu











































10. Repeat steps (3)-(9) until ce, cu, J, ∂J/∂N converge.
Since we solve the model on a discrete grid of points, the policy functions and value func-
tions that we describe in the above steps have to be approximated between grid points.
A good interpolation method that preserves the monotonicity and concavity of the value
function is crucial for the stability and accuracy of the algorithm. Most Chebychev poly-
nomial basis interpolation or other higher order approximations, including many forms
of splines, can destroy the stability of the algorithm by producing internodal oscillations.
For the sake of stability, we use the simplicial linear interpolation described in Judd (1998)
which preserves the contraction property of the Bellman operator, which guarantees con-
vergence. Since the dimension is less than 4, the simplicial linear interpolation is relatively
easy to implement in our application. We setup the grid in k and k′ direction so that we
include many points near the borrowing limits (where there is a lot of curvature) and few
20grid points for larger values. The number of points are 50-60 for k and 150-200 for k′.
Our results are not sensitive to increasing the number of grid points in either the k or k′
direction.
A.2.2 Computation of the wealth distribution
One of main steps in solving the model is to pin down the law of motion K′. In order to
calculate it, we need to derive a time series of aggregate capital stocks {Kt}
T
t=1 and use
this time series to estimate the transition function H mapping Kt+1 into Kt. One possible
approach to generate Kt is to simulate the behavior of a large number of consumers for
each time period as proposed in Krusell and Smith (1998) and compute Kt as the average
of their holdings. The drawback of this simulation method is that it is inaccurate, even
with a very large number of agents. Here we discretize the state space and approximate
the CDF as a step function to avoid doing any Monte Carlo simulation. The computation
can be summarized as follows:
1. Simulate a long time series of aggregate shocks of length T using the transition
matrix (23).
2. Specify grids on individual capital holdings k such that the grid is ﬁner than the
one used to compute the optimal decision rules. We use 240 to 400 grid points in
this step.
3. Choose an initial distribution function Q0 (k) over the grid. We generally assume
that everyone has the same capital stock to begin with. We also try other distribu-
tion function such as uniform distribution, but it won’t aﬀect the result.
4. Use the decision rules calculated from section A.2.1, we can compute the inverse of




j (ki, ˜ χ), j = e,u, over the chosen grid.
5. Given the distribution Qn and aggregate values (˜ χ) at time period n, the distribution
at n + 1 is




e (ki, ˜ χ)
￿




u (ki, ˜ χ)
￿




j (ki, ˜ χ) are not grid points, we use linear







6. Compute the aggregate moments at time n+1 using Qn+1. For example the aggre-
gate capital is given by
Kn+1 = k1Qn+1 (k1) +
ηk X
i=2
(Qn+1 (ki) − Qn+1 (ki−1))(ki + ki−1)/2.
where ηk is the number of grid points in k for the purpose of computing the wealth
distribution. The dimension of this grid should be in general larger than the dimen-
sion of the grid to compute the decision rules.
7. After getting the long time series for aggregate capital, we can run the regressions
to compute the law of motion for K′ and the π and w functions.
A.2.3 Solving the optimal job posting
To ﬁnd the wage and the matching probability, it is necessary to solve for the optimal
vacancies in equation (15). Notice that (15) is a nonlinear in V , which appears in both
hand sides of the equation.4 We may use nonlinear equation solver to solve for V , however,
it is easy to fail in getting the solution. We use similar idea of solving the worker’s problem
to iteratively ﬁnd the ﬁxed point of V .
Along the simulation path, for any period of time n, we are given the value of aggregate
states (˜ χ). (1) We start with an initial guess on V , then we calculate the next period
employment N′and the left-hand side of equation (15). (2) Use the procedure in section
A.2.2 to compute the next period wealth distribution and update the aggregate moments
for the next period. (3) Base on states (˜ χ′) and distribution Q′, calculate the righ-hand
side of equation (15) using the functions from section (A.2.1). (4) If the diﬀerence between
both hand side of the equation is smaller than the tolerance value , stop; otherwise repeat
steps (1) - (3).






. On the right-hand side, the function
∂J (k′, ˜ χ′)/∂N′ is a function of N′ which in turn implicitly depends on V .
22As one can see, the above iterative procedure is embedded into the computation of
the wealth distribution. Once we solve for V , we can calculate w and π for any particular
time period.
A.3 Numerical Solution
Table 21 documents some details about the numerical solutions. In choosing the grid
points for individual capital, the borrowing constraint provides the lower bound for k.
The upper bound of k is set to be 3 - 4 times larger than the steady state value of
aggregate capital in the full insurance case. Unfortunately, there is no much guidance
available when specifying the grids for the aggregate states. Finding sensible bounds
required substantial trial and error. We chose a log-linear form for the law of motion of
K′ and for w and π. The coeﬃcients in these functions are obtained by running OLS
regressions. We report the equilibrium results in Tables 22-23. We can see that the
measures of ﬁt, either the R2 or the relative errors, are extremely good, showing that
increasing the moments in the wealth distribution would bring marginal gains.
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Table 3: Cross-Correlations of x with Output (US Data)
Variable xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3
N 0.23 0.46 0.69 0.83 0.86 0.74 0.55
C 0.31 0.54 0.72 0.85 0.76 0.62 0.44
V-U 0.27 0.51 0.72 0.84 0.83 0.69 0.50
Wage 0.71 0.70 0.65 0.53 0.37 0.19 0.02
Table 4: Standard Deviations (Relative to Output)





Table 5: Cross-Correlations of x with Output (Uninsured Risk)
Variable xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3
N 0.03 0.20 0.40 0.66 0.98 0.82 0.56
C 0.00 0.22 0.51 0.88 0.75 0.62 0.49
V-U 0.23 0.44 0.69 1.00 0.68 0.43 0.23
Wage 0.23 0.44 0.69 1.00 0.68 0.42 0.22
Table 6: Cross-Correlations of x with Output (Full Insurance)
Variable xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3
N 0.01 0.17 0.38 0.64 0.96 0.83 0.59
C 0.03 0.26 0.55 0.92 0.75 0.60 0.45
V-U 0.21 0.42 0.68 0.99 0.75 0.51 0.29
Wage 0.23 0.43 0.69 1.00 0.69 0.43 0.23
25Table 7: Autocorrelations (Uninsured Risk)
Variable 1st Lag 2nd Lag 3rd Lag
Y 0.69 0.44 0.23
N 0.80 0.52 0.28
C 0.79 0.59 0.41
V-U 0.68 0.43 0.23
Wage 0.68 0.42 0.22
Table 8: Autocorrelations (Full Insurance)
Variable 1st Lag 2nd Lag 3rd Lag
Y 0.69 0.44 0.23
N 0.80 0.42 0.21
C 0.76 0.55 0.36
V-U 0.75 0.49 0.27
Wage 0.70 0.44 0.24






Table 10: Cross-Correlations of x with Output (Heterogeneous Patience)
Variable xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3
N 0.13 0.35 0.58 0.81 0.96 0.95 0.85
C 0.49 0.71 0.91 1.00 0.89 0.68 0.44
V-U 0.61 0.80 0.93 0.90 0.63 0.37 0.15
Wage 0.58 0.78 0.94 0.96 0.74 0.49 0.25
Table 11: Autocorrelations (Heterogeneous Patience)
Variable 1st Lag 2nd Lag 3rd Lag
Y 0.90 0.70 0.47
N 0.93 0.78 0.59
C 0.90 0.69 0.46
V-U 0.77 0.53 0.31
Wage 0.84 0.60 0.37






Table 13: Cross-Correlations of x with Output (Irreversible Investment)
Variable xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3
N 0.04 0.20 0.41 0.67 0.98 0.81 0.55
C 0.13 0.35 0.63 0.98 0.73 0.52 0.34
V-U 0.23 0.44 0.69 1.00 0.67 0.42 0.21
Wage 0.23 0.44 0.69 1.00 0.67 0.42 0.22
Table 14: Autocorrelations (Irreversible Investment)
Variable 1st Lag 2nd Lag 3rd Lag
Y 0.69 0.43 0.23
N 0.80 0.52 0.27
C 0.71 0.47 0.27
V-U 0.68 0.42 0.22
Wage 0.68 0.43 0.22






Table 16: Cross-Correlations of x with Output (Minimum Consumption)
Variable xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3
N 0.02 0.18 0.38 0.64 0.95 0.83 0.58
C 0.00 0.22 0.51 0.89 0.75 0.61 0.48
V-U 0.21 0.42 0.68 0.99 0.75 0.51 0.29
Wage 0.22 0.43 0.69 1.00 0.74 0.48 0.26
27Table 17: Autocorrelations (Minimum Consumption)
Variable 1st Lag 2nd Lag 3rd Lag
Y 0.69 0.43 0.23
N 0.77 0.49 0.26
C 0.77 0.57 0.38
V-U 0.65 0.41 0.23
Wage 0.73 0.47 0.25
28Table 18: Standard Deviations (Relative to Output)

















Cumulative Wealth Distribution: Benchmark
Capital
Figure 1: CDF of asset holdings in the baseline uninsurable risk economy.
29Table 19: Cross-Correlations of x with Output (High Earnings Variability)
Variable xt−3 xt−2 xt−1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3
N 0.07 0.23 0.44 0.70 0.99 0.79 0.52
C 0.04 0.26 0.55 0.90 0.78 0.65 0.51
V-U 0.26 0.47 0.71 1.00 0.75 0.51 0.29
Wage 0.24 0.45 0.70 1.00 0.67 0.42 0.22
Table 20: Autocorrelations (High Earnings Variability)
Variable 1st Lag 2nd Lag 3rd Lag
Y 0.70 0.45 0.24
N 0.78 0.51 0.27
C 0.80 0.61 0.42
V-U 0.67 0.41 0.20
Wage 0.67 0.42 0.22
Table 21: Details of numerical solutions
Property Benchmark Full Irreversible
Insurance Investment
Moments Used Mean Mean Mean
Interpolation Method Piecewise Linear Piecewise Linear Piecewise Linear
Grid Dimension
Individual Problem ηk = 50, ηk′ = 150 N/A ηk = 55, ηk′ = 200
Aggregate States ηN = 5, ηK = 5 ηN = 10, ηK = 50 ηN = 5, ηK = 5
Wealth Distribution ηk = 240 N/A ηk = 350
Functional Form Log Linear Log Linear Log Linear
Table 22: Equilibrium Results of Benchmark Model
Function Coeﬃcients R2 Relative Errors
HI lnK′ = 0.117 + 0.073lnz + 0.131lnN + 0.972lnK 1.0 0.01%
w(zh) lnw = −0.220 + 1.033lnN + 0.341lnK 1.0 0.02%
w(zl) lnw = −0.234 + 1.055lnN + 0.340lnK 1.0 0.02%
π (zh) lnπ = −0.612 + 1.145lnN + 0.087lnK 1.0 0.02%
π (zl) lnπ = −0.612 + 1.160lnN + 0.087lnK 1.0 0.02%
Table 23: Equilibrium Results of Irreversible Investment
Function Coeﬃcients R2 Relative Errors
HI lnK′ = 0.099 + 0.037lnz + 0.065lnN + 0.980lnK 1.0 0.01%
w(zh) lnw = −0.287 + 0.658lnN + 0.351lnK 1.0 0.05%
w(zl) lnw = −0.302 + 0.663lnN + 0.350lnK 1.0 0.05%
π (zh) lnπ = −0.663 + 1.029lnN + 0.078lnK 1.0 0.02%
π (zl) lnπ = −0.674 + 1.026lnN + 0.079lnK 1.0 0.02%









Cumulative Wealth Distribution: High Wealth Inequality
Capital
Figure 2: CDF of asset holdings in the economy with varying discount factors.
















Figure 3: Comparison of the CDFs of asset holdings in the baseline uninsurable risk
economy (solid line) versus the economy with idiosyncratic productivity shocks (dotted
line).
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